

# Counting uses of a theorem

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## Motivating question:

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$RT(2, n)$  is Ramsey's theorem for pairs and  $n$  colors:

Given  $f : ([\mathbb{N}]^2) \rightarrow n$ , we can find an infinite  $X \subset \mathbb{N}$  and an  $i < n$  such that  $f([X]^2) = i$ .


Vocabulary:

$f$  is a coloring with  $n$  colors.

$X$  is an infinite monochromatic set.


## Pictures related to $RT(2, 2)$

**Theorem:** ( $RT(2, 2)$ ) If  $G$  is the complete graph with vertices  $V = \{v_0, v_1, \dots\}$ , and  $f : [V]^2 \rightarrow \{\text{red}, \text{blue}\}$  colors the edges of  $G$ , then there is an infinite  $S \subset V$  such that the subgraph with vertices from  $S$  is monochromatic.




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## Further motivation

$\text{RCA}_0$  can prove  $\text{RT}(2, 4)$  with **two** uses of  $\text{RT}(2, 2)$ .

Given  $f : [\mathbb{N}]^2 \rightarrow 4$ , define:

$$g_1(m, n) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } f(m, n) \in \{0, 1\} \\ 1 & \text{if } f(m, n) \in \{2, 3\} \end{cases}$$

Let  $X = \{x_0, x_1, \dots\}$  be an infinite monochromatic set for  $g_1$ .  
Note that  $f([X]^2) \in \{0, 1\}$  or  $f([X]^2) \in \{2, 3\}$ .

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$$g_2(m, n) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } f(x_m, x_n) \text{ is even} \\ 1 & \text{if } f(x_m, x_n) \text{ is odd} \end{cases}$$

Let  $Y$  be an infinite monochromatic set for  $g_2$ . Then  $Z = \{x_m \mid m \in Y\}$  is monochromatic for  $f$ .



## Motivating question:

Can you prove  $RT(2, 4)$  with **one** use of  $RT(2, 2)$ ?

Answers:

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## Answers:

NO

YES

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## Answers:

NO: The intuitionistic system  $iRCA_0^\omega$  cannot prove  $RT(2, 4)$  with one typical use of  $RT(2, 2)$ .

YES:  $RCA_0$  can prove  $RT(2, 4)$  with one use of  $RT(2, 2)$ .

## One is not enough: Vocabulary

An axiom system formulated by Kohlenbach [3]

$iRCA_0^\omega$  includes:

$\widehat{E-HA}_\uparrow^\omega$  Intuitionistic arithmetic in all finite types with restricted induction and primitive recursion

QF-AC<sup>1,0</sup> A choice scheme that implies the recursive comprehension axiom (RCA)

Note: Intuitionistic systems cannot prove  
all instances of the law of the excluded middle:  $\neg A \vee A$

We consider *problems* of the form  $P : \forall x(p_1(x) \rightarrow \exists y p_2(x, y))$

$p_1(x)$  means  $x$  is an instance of the problem  $P$

$p_2(x, y)$  means  $y$  is a solution of the instance  $x$  of the problem  $P$ .

## One is not enough: What does recursive mean?

A function  $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$  is recursive (or computable) if there is a deterministic algorithm that for every input number eventually halts and outputs a number.

A set  $x \subset \mathbb{N}$  is recursive if there is a recursive function  $f$  such that  $x = \{n \in \mathbb{N} \mid f(n) \neq 0\}$ .

The **Recursive Comprehension Axiom** formalizes: if  $f$  is a recursive function, then the set  $x = \{n \in \mathbb{N} \mid f(n) \neq 0\}$  exists. (Note: Actually, RCA asserts the existence of sets that are recursive relative to known sets.)

The recursive comprehension axiom is the main set existence axiom in  $\text{RCA}_0$ , the base axiom system for reverse mathematics.

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## One is not enough: Weihrauch reductions

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In this setting  $Q \leq_W P$  means there are computable functionals  $\psi$  and  $\phi$  such that

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & \psi & \\ x_Q & \longrightarrow & x_P \\ \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ y_Q & \longleftarrow & y_P \\ & \phi & \end{array}$$

Note:  $\phi$  can use information about  $x_Q$  to compute  $y_Q$ . (This is weak reduction.)

## One is not enough: Formalized Weihrauch reductions

Given problems:

$P : \forall x(p_1(x) \rightarrow \exists y p_2(x, y))$  and  $Q : \forall x(q_1(x) \rightarrow \exists y q_2(x, y))$

in the language of  $iRCA_0^\omega$ , we use  $Q \leq_W P$  to abbreviate

$\exists \varphi \exists \psi \forall u (q_1(u) \rightarrow (p_1(\varphi(u)) \wedge \forall y [p_2(\varphi(u), y) \rightarrow q_2(u, \psi(u, y))]))$

Which says that there are functionals  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$  such that

$q_1(u)$  If  $u$  is an instance of  $Q$

$p_1(\varphi(u))$  then  $\varphi(u)$  is an instance of  $P$

$p_2(\varphi(u), y)$  such that whenever  $y$  is a solution the instance  $\varphi(u)$  of the problem  $P$

$q_2(u, \psi(u, y))$   $\psi(u, y)$  computes a solution to the instance  $u$  of the problem  $Q$

In computability theory,  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$  are computable functionals



## One is not enough: What does one mean?

A theory proves Q with one typical use of P if

From  $q_1(u)$  we can deduce the existence of  $x_u$ , an instance of P.

From  $p_1(x_u) \rightarrow \exists y p_2(x_u, y)$  we can deduce the existence of  $v_{x_u, y}$  with  $q_2(u, v_{x_u, y})$ .

**Theorem:** If P and Q are nice problems then  $iRCA_0^\omega$  proves Q with one typical use of P if and only if  $iRCA_0^\omega \vdash Q \leq_W P$ .

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**Theorem:** If P and Q are nice problems then  $iRCA_0^\omega$  proves Q with one typical use of P if and only if  $iRCA_0^\omega \vdash Q \leq_w P$ .

Nice problems:  $q_1(u) \rightarrow (p_1(x) \wedge [p_2(x, y) \rightarrow q_2(u, v)])$  is in  $\Gamma_1$

Proof uses modified reducibility [2], adapted from Kohlenbach.

Rutger Kuyper [4] has proved related results.

# One is not enough: The main result

## Corollary:

$iRCA_0^\omega$  cannot prove  $RT(2, 4)$  with one typical use of  $RT(2, 2)$ .

Proof in three steps:

1:  $RT(2, 4) \not\leq_W RT(2, 2)$  Dorais, Shafer et al [1]

2:  $iRCA_0^\omega \not\vdash RT(2, 4) \leq_W RT(2, 2)$   
 $iRCA_0^\omega$  lies only by omission

3: Apply the previous theorem.

## Sometimes, one is enough

**Claim:**  $\text{RCA}_0$  can prove  $\text{RT}(2, 4)$  with one use of  $\text{RT}(2, 2)$ .

Sketch: Given  $f : [\mathbb{N}]^2 \rightarrow 4$ , either

- $\exists X$  infinite with  $f([X]^2) \subset \{a_0, a_1\} \subset \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$   
or
- there is no such  $X$ .

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- $\exists X$  infinite with  $f([X]^2) \subset \{a_0, a_1\} \subset \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$

Fix such an  $X = \{x_0, x_1, \dots\}$  and set  $j = 0$

- there is no such  $X$ .

Let  $X = \mathbb{N}$  and set  $j = 1$

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- there is no such  $X$ .

Let  $X = \mathbb{N}$  and set  $j = 1$

Define  $g : [\mathbb{N}]^2 \rightarrow 2$  by:

$$g(m, n) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } j = 0 \wedge f(x_m, x_n) = a_0 \\ 1 & \text{if } j = 0 \wedge f(x_m, x_n) = a_1 \\ 0 & \text{if } j = 1 \wedge f(x_m, x_n) \in \{0, 1\} \\ 1 & \text{if } j = 1 \wedge f(x_m, x_n) \in \{2, 3\} \end{cases}$$

If  $Y$  is mono. for  $g$ , then  $j = 0$  and  $\{x_m \mid m \in Y\}$  is mono. for  $f$ .

## Some references

- [1] François G. Dorais, Damir D. Dzhamalov, Jeffrey L. Hirst, Joseph R. Mileti, and Paul Shafer, *On uniform relationships between combinatorial problems*, Trans. AMS **368** (2014), 1321–1359. DOI [10.1090/tran/6465](https://doi.org/10.1090/tran/6465).
  
- [2] Jeffrey L. Hirst and Carl Mummert, *Reverse mathematics and uniformity in proofs without excluded middle*, Notre Dame J. Form. Log. **52** (2011), no. 2, 149–162. DOI [10.1215/00294527-1306163](https://doi.org/10.1215/00294527-1306163).
  
- [3] Ulrich Kohlenbach, *Higher order reverse mathematics*, Reverse Mathematics 2001 (Stephen G. Simpson, ed.), Lect. Notes Log., vol. 21, Assoc. Symbol. Logic, La Jolla, CA, 2005, pp. 281–295.
  
- [4] Rutger Kuyper, *On Weihrauch reducibility and intuitionistic reverse mathematics*. Preprint, [arXiv:1511.05189v1](https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.05189v1).